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Miranda’s
Demise?
Steven D. Clymer

Miranda to Dickerson:
Miranda v. Arizona1 has been a prominent fixture
of the American criminal justice system, as well as
A Very Brief History
police television shows and movies, for more than a
The 1966 Miranda decision was a tour de force in
third of a century. And when, amid considerable
constitutional interpretation. After having experifanfare, the Supreme Court in June 2000 anmented with both the Due Process Clause and the
nounced its decision in Dickerson v. United States,2
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as means of
it appeared that Miranda would retain that status
controlling pernicious police interrogation pracfor the foreseeable future. In Dickerson, a surpristices, the Court, in Miranda, turned to the Fifth
ingly large 7–2 majority settled a long-standing
Amendment self-incrimination clause. The Court
debate about the constitutional legitimacy of
determined that custodial police interrogation, by
Miranda, holding that the Miranda rules are firmly
its nature, forces arrested suspects to answer quesgrounded in the Fifth Amendment’s self-incriminations. It concluded that suspects’ answers to such
tion clause.
questioning are inherently “compelled” and thus
But now, a mere three years
later, Miranda’s fortunes have
In May of this year, a divided Supreme Court cast
shifted dramatically. In May of
this year, a divided Supreme
doubt on whether Miranda imposes an obligation on
Court cast doubt on whether
Miranda imposes an obligation
police when they question arrested suspects.
on police when they question
arrested suspects. And, in the
inadmissible in criminal prosecutions by virtue of
coming Term, the Court will decide two cases that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
further will determine whether Miranda will conself-incrimination. But, the Miranda Court struck
tinue to play a significant role in regulating police
a compromise of sorts, giving police an opportuinterrogation practices. There is a good chance that
nity to “dispel” the compulsion and thus obtain
by this time next year, with tacit approval from the
admissible responses to their questions. To do so,
Court, many police departments will spend more
police had to give the now-famous warnings and
time and energy devising methods of circumventobtain from suspects affirmative waivers of their
ing the Miranda rules than following them. In
“rights” to remain silent and consult with counsel.
order to understand why Miranda’s future looks so
If suspects asserted rather than waived their rights,
precarious, it is helpful to begin by briefly reviewpolice were supposed to honor those invocations by
ing its past.3
terminating interrogation.
Fall/Winter 2003
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In the decades following Miranda, the Court
refined the new doctrine. Many decisions addressed
predictable issues: what constitutes “custody” and
“interrogation” for purposes of triggering the warnings and waiver requirements;4 what sorts of
responses are sufficient to qualify as waivers of
rights;5 and whether police are foreclosed from
making additional efforts to secure waivers once
suspects invoke their right to counsel or to remain
silent.6 But, two more fundamental interpretative
issues soon arose, ones that would play a critical
role in determining the meaning and operation of
Miranda. One issue involved the constitutional
legitimacy of Miranda; the other affected police
compliance with the Miranda rules.
The first issue surfaced in a series of cases beginning in 1974 with Michigan v. Tucker,7 in which
the Court began to describe Miranda as if it were
something less than a constitutional requirement.
In those cases, the Court explained that Miranda
“sweeps more broadly” than the Constitution and
requires suppression even when police do not use
constitutionally-prohibited compulsion during
questioning. The Court seemed to have concluded
that the secrecy of the police interrogation process
and the inevitable swearing contests at suppression
hearings between police officers and suspects about
what had occurred during questioning made it
prohibitively difficult for courts to determine
whether police actually had coerced a suspect into
answering questions. As a result, Miranda’s bright
line rule—suppression of statements absent affirmative proof of police compliance with the
warning and waiver requirements—was a necessary
prophylaxis.
Whatever the merits of that reasoning, the
Court’s description of Miranda as extending beyond the boundaries of the Constitution presented
a problem. If the Miranda doctrine sweeps more
broadly than the Constitution, then some violations of Miranda are not violations of the
Constitution. But, if a Miranda violation is not a
constitutional violation, by what authority can the
Supreme Court require the suppression in state
4

court proceedings of a suspect’s statements taken
in violation of only the prophylactic Miranda
rules? And, even if the Court’s supervisory power
permits it to require such a rule in federal courts,
why can’t Congress overrule it, as it attempted to
do when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a statute
permitting the introduction of voluntary confessions in federal courts even absent compliance with
the Miranda rules? These questions about the
constitutional legitimacy of Miranda triggered a
decades-long debate, one that was not resolved
until the Dickerson decision.
The second issue, police compliance, arose in a
series of Supreme Court decisions that addressed
the consequences of violations of the Miranda
rules —situations in which police question an
arrested suspect without first properly advising
him of his rights (“failure-to-warn violations”) or
continue to question an arrested suspect after his
assertion of his right to silence or counsel (“failureto-honor violations”). Although Miranda had held
that the prosecution is forbidden from introducing
statements resulting from such violations in its
case-in-chief, the Court left open the question
whether prosecutors can use such statements to
impeach defendants who give inconsistent trial
testimony. Likewise, Miranda did not determine
whether prosecutors can admit evidentiary fruits of
statements that police obtain by violating the
Miranda rules, such as physical evidence or testimony from witnesses identified in suspects’
statements.
In two post-Miranda cases, the Court determined categorically that prosecutors are free to
impeach testifying defendants with inconsistent
statements made following either failure-to-warn

The Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court
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or failure-to-honor Miranda violations.8 Although,
have criticized both the Court for creating the
to date, the Court has been less categorical on the
incentives and the police for acting on them.11
fruits issue, it held in one case that the prosecution
There seemed to be a connection between these
could call a witness whom police had identified
two issues—the scope of the Miranda exclusionary
only because of a statement that a suspect gave
rule and Miranda’s constitutional legitimacy. When
without having received proper Miranda warnings.9 the government compels a statement from a person
Similarly, in another case, the Court held that
outside the context of custodial interrogation,
when police first obtained a statement by question- thereby triggering the protections of the selfing an arrested suspect without Miranda warnings,
incrimination clause, the prosecution is forbidden
a later statement that the suspect made following
from making any use of the statement in a criminal
Miranda warnings was not tainted by the first
prosecution of the person who made the statement.
statement.10
For example, in the context of grand jury investigaThese impeachment and fruits decisions do
tions, witnesses sometime refuse to answer
more than determine what sort of evidence the
questions by asserting their Fifth Amendment
prosecution can admit at trial. They create affirma- privilege. The prosecution can overcome that assertive incentives for police to violate the Miranda
tion, and compel answers, by obtaining a grant of
rules. If an earlier un-warned statement does not
immunity. But, although an immunized witness
taint a suspect’s later, post-Miranda statement,
has to answer questions or face contempt of court
police have reason to question a suspect without
sanctions, the prosecution cannot use a statement
advising him of his rights to
silence and counsel. Such quesQuestions about the constitutional legitimacy of
tioning may increase the chances
of obtaining a statement which,
Miranda triggered a decades-long debate, one
although inadmissible in the
that was not resolved until the Dickerson decision.
prosecution’s case-in-chief, can
serve as a “beachhead.” By later
warning the suspect of his rights, police can “cure”
compelled by an immunity grant in any way if it
the earlier violation and likely persuade the suspect, later prosecutes the witness. Thus, the prosecution
who already has “let the cat out of the bag,” to
cannot introduce the immunized statement in its
repeat the statement. Under the Court’s approach,
case-in-chief against the witness-turned-defendant,
the second statement is freely admissible.
and, in contrast to the rules that apply in the
In addition, police have little reason to stop
Miranda context, cannot use it to impeach inconquestioning when a suspect invokes his right to
sistent trial testimony or introduce any evidentiary
silence or counsel. Honoring the assertion of rights
fruits of the statement. There was reason to believe
forecloses the chance of obtaining any statement;
that the more limited exclusionary sanction in the
dishonoring the assertion can lead to acquisition of Miranda context was an outgrowth of the Court’s
a statement that, although inadmissible in the
characterization of Miranda as only a prophylactic
prosecution’s case-in-chief, can be used to impeach rule. The Court seemed to have concluded that
the suspect at trial (and perhaps deter the defenviolations of the merely prophylactic Miranda rules
dant from testifying at all) or aid in discovery of
required a less drastic response than the Fifth
other evidence. Indeed, in recent years, a number
Amendment privilege itself required in other conof police officers and departments have chosen to
texts. Thus, when the Supreme Court granted
deliberately violate the Miranda rules because of
review in Dickerson—to consider whether Congress
these evidentiary incentives. Supporters of Miranda
Fall/Winter 2003
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had the authority to overrule Miranda—it appeared that the Court was poised to confront both
the legitimacy issue and questions regarding the
scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule.

Dickerson v. United States:
Affirmation or Only a Brief Reprieve?
In 1968, two years after the Court decided
Miranda, Congress attempted to overturn it. It did
so by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a statute requiring federal courts to admit defendants’ post-arrest
statements as long as they were voluntarily made.
Under Section 3501, a failure to advise an arrested
suspect of his rights was a factor to be considered in
assessing voluntariness but, in contrast to the
Miranda doctrine, did not require suppression.
Although Section 3501 has been available since
1968, the Department of Justice rarely argued in
court that it trumped Miranda. In Dickerson, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals sua sponte relied
on Section 3501 to reverse a district court’s order
suppressing a confession that an FBI agent obtained without Miranda warnings. The appellate
court ruled that the confession, because it was
voluntary, was admissible despite the failure to
follow Miranda. When the Supreme Court chose
to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision, it was
obvious that it would resolve the long-standing
debate about Miranda’s legitimacy.
At first blush, the result in Dickerson appeared
to be a stunning victory for Miranda’s defenders.
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who long ago had touched off the legitimacy debate in his opinion in Michigan v. Tucker, seven
members of the Court rejected the notion that
Congress could overrule Miranda. Rather, the
Court held that Miranda was a constitutionallybased rule, resting firmly on the Fifth Amendment
privilege. The Court had resolved the debate in
Miranda’s favor, making clear that it Miranda’s
constitutional pedigree was pure.
But, upon closer inspection, the Dickerson opinion cast a shadow on Miranda’s future. First, no
6

member of the Court expressed any real enthusiasm for Miranda. Rather than extolling the virtues
of the Miranda doctrine or its importance in regulating police interrogation practices, the Court’s
opinion simply noted that it had in the past described and treated Miranda as if it were a
constitutionally-based decision and that the Court
was reluctant, for purposes of stare decisis, to
change course, “[w]hether or not we would agree
with Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule,
were we addressing the issue in the first instance.”12 Remarkably, the Court seemed unwilling
to endorse even the most basic tenets of Miranda,
ascribing them instead to the Miranda Court. For
example, the Dickerson Court stated that the
“Miranda Court” had concluded that the warning
and waiver requirements were necessary to overcome the pressures of custodial interrogation, but
never expressed agreement with either this or any
other premise of the Miranda decision. Similarly,
Dickerson was noticeably devoid of any concurring
opinion extolling the importance of Miranda as a
means of regulating police interrogation.
Second, contrary to the views of many commentators that the legitimacy question was linked
to the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule, the
Dickerson Court appeared to see no inconsistency
between a constitutionally-based Miranda doctrine
and a watered-down exclusionary sanction. Although the Dickerson Court did not address the
scope of the exclusionary sanction directly, it described with approval some of its decisions
permitting impeachment with statements taken in
violation of Miranda and the admission of fruits of
such statements. Thus, while the Court made clear
that Miranda has a constitutional foundation, it
appeared to leave intact the incentives for police to
violate the Miranda rules.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the
Court used language suggesting that even if
Miranda has a constitutional foundation, the foundation is not as solid as Miranda’s supporters
would like. In several places, the Dickerson Court
described Miranda as a rule of admissibility, not a
rule governing police conduct. Coupled with the
Cornell Law Forum

Court’s lack of enthusiasm for Miranda and its
willingness to create incentives for police to violate
the Miranda rules, those passages set the stage for
what may be Miranda’s demise.

Miranda’s Foundation:
What Does the Privilege Require?

order, their decision is properly based on an assessment of the costs and benefits of compliance and
non-compliance with the warning and waiver requirements.
Last term, in Chavez v. Martinez,13 the Court
adopted the view that the privilege is a rule that
governs only admissibility, not one that operates as
a direct restraint on police conduct. Chavez involved a police investigation gone tragically awry.
Martinez, a farm worker, was riding a bicycle in
Oxnard, California as two officers were investigating possible drug sales. The officers stopped
Martinez. Although a number of facts are in dispute, no one doubts that Martinez struggled with
one of the officers and that the other officer, believing that Martinez had taken her partner’s service
revolver, shot Martinez, leaving him blind and
partially paralyzed. Chavez, a police supervisor who
was not involved in the stop or shooting, attempted
to interview Martinez in the hospital emergency
room despite both Martinez’s anguished pleas that
he be left alone and hospital workers’ requests that

Miranda’s constitutional foundation, the Fifth
Amendment privilege, provides that “no person…
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.” The text of the privilege
thus suggests that what it prohibits is not “compulsion” per se but rather the admission “in any
criminal case” of a compelled statement “against”
the person who gave it. In other words, a violation
only occurs if and when a compelled statement is
admitted into evidence, not when it is compelled.
This understanding of the privilege is significant
for at least two reasons.
First, if admission in a criminal case is necessary
for a violation to exist, then police use of compulsion alone to obtain a statement
does not violate the privilege. To
A violation only occurs if and when a compelled
be sure, extreme forms of compulsion would still violate
statement is admitted into evidence, not when
another constitutional right. The
it is compelled.
Court has made clear that the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit police conChavez leave. Martinez did provide some answers
duct that “shocks the conscience,” including use of
in response to Chavez’s persistent questioning.
physical force, threats of force, and extreme forms
Martinez, who was never prosecuted for a crime,
of psychological coercion during interrogation.
sued the police department, alleging that police had
But, transgressions of the Miranda rules alone do
violated a number of his constitutional rights.
not violate due process. Thus, police would not be
Among other things, Martinez claimed that
liable for civil rights violations for merely failing to
Chavez’s persistent questioning violated both his
follow the Miranda rules.
due process rights and his “right to remain silent”
Second, and more significantly, if compulsion
under the Fifth Amendment privilege.
alone does not violate the privilege, then police
Although a majority of the Supreme Court was
commit no constitutional wrong by disregarding
willing to permit Martinez to pursue his due prothe Miranda requirements. In other words, police
cess claim, it rejected his view of the privilege. The
have no constitutional obligation to follow
Court held that, as a general matter, admission of a
Miranda. Instead, like a prosecutor deciding
compelled statement in a criminal case is necessary
whether to use the compulsion of an immunity
for a finding that the Fifth Amendment privilege
has been violated. Martinez was never prosecuted
Fall/Winter 2003
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for a crime and thus his statements to Chavez were
never admitted in a criminal case against him. As a
result, under the Court’s interpretation of the
privilege, he suffered no violation of his Fifth
Amendment privilege.
Chavez has profound implications for the
Miranda doctrine. If Miranda’s constitutional
foundation—the Fifth Amendment privilege—
cannot be violated without use of a compelled
statement in a criminal case, it would seem that the
same holds true for Miranda. If so, police commit
no constitutional violation if they disregard the
Miranda rules. Thus, by its decision in Chavez and
the cases in which it has permitted impeachment
use of statements taken in violation of the Miranda
rules and at least some evidentiary fruits of such
statements, the Court seems both to permit police
to disregard Miranda and to provide incentives for
them to do so.

The Future of Miranda:
Next Term and Beyond

sible Mirandized confession, deliberately refrained
from giving warnings when they started interrogating a murder suspect. Once the suspect gave a
statement, the police then warned her of her rights
and had her repeat the statement. Although, as
explained above, the Supreme Court had previously permitted the introduction of a second,
post-Miranda statement taken under similar circumstances, the lower court in Seibert held that the
second statement should be suppressed if the initial violation is deliberate. The chances are good
that the Court will reject that conclusion. First, if,
as Chavez suggests, police have no constitutional
duty to comply with the Miranda rules, then there
seems to be no reason why a decision to deliberately violate the rules at the outset of the
interrogation should matter. Second, in an analogous Fourth Amendment context, the Court has
held that a police officer’s subjective motivation
has no bearing on the legality of an arrest.16
Rather, as long as objective circumstances establish
probable cause to support an arrest, the officer’s

When the Court decides the two Miranda cases on
its docket for next Term, it will make clear just
how much or how little Miranda will continue to
matter. One case, United States v. Patane,14 raises
the fruits question: whether a firearm, which police
found only as a result of a statement taken in violation of the
The Court seems both to permit police to disregard
Miranda rules, should be admissible. If the Court follows what
Miranda and to provide incentives for them to do so.
appears to be the trend emerging
from its earlier decisions, as well
as language in a handful of both majority and consubjective motivation for making the arrest is
curring opinions, it likely will hold that even when
irrelevant. A similar approach in the Miranda
Miranda requires suppression of a post-arrest state- context would foreclose inquiry into whether a
ment, all evidentiary fruits are admissible.
police officer’s violation of Miranda is deliberate.
The other case, Missouri v. Seibert,15 raises the
Third, as explained above, this Court seems unquestion whether more stringent suppression rules
willing to champion extensions of Miranda.
should apply when police deliberately violate the
If the Court decides Patane and Seibert as preMiranda rules in order to take advantage of the
dicted, Miranda will, by the end of next year’s
evidentiary benefits that the Court has created. In
Term, be reduced to a set of rules that police can
Seibert, the police, hoping to obtain a fully admisignore deliberately when it is advantageous for
them to do so. Although Miranda still will require
8
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suppression in the prosecution’s case-in-chief of
any statement taken after a failure-to-warn or a
failure-to-honor violation, police almost certainly
will commit both sorts of violations with some
regularity. They often will question suspects without warnings in hopes of minimizing the likelihood
of an invocation of rights, and warn only after the
suspects have given statements that they are likely
to repeat even after receiving warnings. When faced
with assertions of the rights to silence or counsel,
assertions that normally would foreclose acquisition
of any statement if the assertions were honored,
police instead will continue to question in hopes of
obtaining statements useful to impeach or as a
source of leads to other evidence.
If all of this happens, it would be perverse and
unfortunate. It would undercut the reason for
having the Miranda rules—to combat the compulsion inherent in police interrogation. Although the
constitutional provision upon which Miranda
rests—the privilege—may be a rule of admissibility, the Miranda Court resorted to it in hopes of
controlling what police did in the interrogation
room. The Miranda Court was willing to impose
the cost of suppression of probative evidence in
order to minimize the risk that police would use
the pressures of custodial interrogation to compel
suspects to confess against their wills. But, if, as
seems likely, the Court signals to police that they
have no constitutional duty to follow the Miranda
rules and that they can gain evidentiary benefits by
violating those rules, Miranda will not serve its
purpose. Police will refrain from giving the pressure-reducing warnings, at least at the outset of
interrogation, and continue to exert pressure even
after suspects ask to remain silent or to speak with
counsel. As a result, the pressure that the Miranda
Court sought to alleviate will play a role in suspects’ decisions to answer questions.
The Court could save Miranda from this fate by
rethinking the decisions in which it created the
incentives for police to violate Miranda. In Patane,
the Court could reverse course and determine that
fruits of statements taken in violation of the
Miranda rules are not admissible. Similarly, the
Fall/Winter 2003

Court could rethink its decisions permitting impeachment use of such statements. If the costs of
violating the Miranda rules outweigh the benefits,
police will comply with the rules, even absent a
constitutional obligation to do so. But, given the
Court’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for Miranda,
it is unlikely that it will adopt this approach or
another that would revitalize Miranda. Instead,
Miranda soon may matter more on television
shows than it does in real-life police stations and
courtrooms.

Steven D. Clymer is a
professor of law at
Cornell Law School.
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